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10 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005 
The first panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence reviews the budget pressures encountered by the judi-
ciary and their impact on judicial independence.  The discussion
was led by then-AJA vice president Michael A. Cicconetti, a munic-
ipal judge from Painesville, Ohio.  Panelists were Michael L.
Buenger, Missouri state court administrator, Lawrence G. Myers,
court administrator for Joplin, Missouri, and Robert Wessels, court
manager for the County Criminal Courts at Law in Houston, Texas.
The National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a
generous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE MICHAEL CICCONETTI:  Michael Buenger, in his recent
article in Court Review,1 . . . makes us aware of the fiscal crisis,
if we don’t know [already], that began in 2001 which has
resulted in many court budgets being cut.  Well, where does that
leave judges?  We have statutory criminal guidelines, require-
ments to dispose of criminal cases.  We may have our state
supreme court guidelines requiring us to dispose of civil cases
in a certain period of time, yet we have mandates to cut our bud-
gets 6%, 10%, whatever it may be, of which 80 or 85% is per-
sonnel.
Then the other constraints on judicial independence:  We
can’t say anything.  You know we have limits on what we can
say.
We also have the reality that many of us are in politics.  We
have to run for election, so do we speak out?  Do we journalize
our court budget and get into a battle with our local funding
authority and then the next year have to face reelection?  . . . .
MR. MICHAEL BUENGER: . . . [T]oday . . . the stakes are very
high.  They’re not only high in terms of budgets, but they’re also
high in terms of attacks on the judiciary, efforts to remove
judges, efforts to impeach judges, so on and so forth, but the
one thing I think is important to keep in mind is that the stakes
have always been high.  Today really isn’t all that different.  It is
just new for us.
I’ll give you the perfect example.  Oddly enough, the “Father
of Judicial Review,” John Marshall, wrote in 1804 a letter to
Justice Chase, who was being subjected to impeachment in the
Senate for his decisions—he suggested to Justice Chase that in
lieu of actually going through impeachment over improper deci-
sions, the legislature ought to form itself as an ultimate court of
appeals.  Now imagine that, the father of judicial review sug-
gesting in an effort perhaps motivated more out of political real-
ity than legal necessity, suggesting that the legislature be in a
position to review the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to
make sure that they comport with the public’s sentiment.
The stakes have always been high.  They are simply higher
today, I think, as a result of the change in the stature of the judi-
ciary in the last 50 years.  There was a time, I think, when you
went into your local communities and you talked to your citi-
zens and judges were viewed as independent actors.  The con-
nection between you and perhaps a judge in the county over
was tenuous, perhaps based on friendship, but certainly not
based on any sense of institutional connectedness.
I think what has happened in the last 50 years is the judiciary
has emerged somewhat along the lines of what Chief Justice
George was saying.  The judiciary has emerged with a new sense
of its institutional standing, and that’s not only a challenge in
terms of funding and in terms of our relationship with our sis-
ter branches.  It’s also a challenge in terms of our relationships
with each other.  What one court does in one part of the state of
Missouri can have implications for all courts in the state of
Missouri now.
The other comment I would make to you is that when it
comes to issues of budget there is, I think, a distinction between
what happens on the state level and what happens on the local
level, and I recognize in making that statement that I may come
across as perhaps disconnected from local concerns, and I’m
not—I actually began my career as a legal counsel for an appel-
late district in Ohio that was funded by the counties—but with
the evolution of state funding for the judiciary, there has
changed the dynamic by which courts get their money, and that
dynamic is basically one in which:  Where do you go as the state
supreme court or as the administrative office of the court when
you have a confrontation with your state legislature over fund-
ing?  Where do you go?
And the reality is there is no place to go, and so it is forcing,
I think, state-funded systems to become much more engaged in
the legislative process to tell the story of the judiciary not only
at the local level, but also at the state level, because in the
absence of public support, in the absence of public understand-
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ing, in the absence of the public’s willingness to in fact support
the concept of judicial independence and an independent judi-
ciary, it will be nearly impossible for us to withstand institu-
tional attacks as we’re seeing them today.  
MR. LAWRENCE MYERS: As Mike said, I’m the municipal court
administrator in Joplin.  Prior to that I had about 25 years of
experience in juvenile courts.  I had the unique experience in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, when I was the court administrator of the
juvenile court, to receive a call from the county commissioner
who funded the juvenile court, saying, “Larry, the county has
50,000 extra dollars.  Could you use it?”
That was more than 20 years ago.  I don’t know that Lou
Harris would make the same call today.
My first three years as the court administrator of the Jackson
County Juvenile Court in Kansas City, Missouri, each year the
circuit court’s budget, of which the juvenile division was a part,
was before the judicial finance committee, trying to resolve the
differences between the executive branch of government and
the judicial branch of government as to what our needs were.
So I’ve seen a little bit of all of it.
I have a very good situation in Joplin, where the 473 munic-
ipal courts in the state of Missouri are funded by the local cities.
Joplin is very kind to us.  I get to prepare my budget with input
from the judge.  It’s presented to the city manager and we are
treated fairly.  That’s not true of other cities.
The topic for today is, “Is judicial independence a casualty
in state and local budget battles?”  In Missouri, in many of the
municipal courts the answer would be no, not because they’re
not a casualty, but because they couldn’t get a ticket to the
fight.  They weren’t invited by the judicial branch, and in fact
at this time the judicial branch of the state is making some
demands on the municipal courts for statewide reporting,
which I support, but they are providing some budget problems
because there are issues that require funding and we did not
have input in the battle.
The battle with the legislature—perhaps the 473 municipal
courts could have helped fight that because we weren’t invested
in getting money from the state, but perhaps we had personal
contacts with our state legislators that could have been advan-
tageous in that battle.
We’re also not invited by the executive branch because
each municipal court has been structured by their city based
upon what the city wanted them to accomplish, and with lit-
tle input from either the legislative or the judicial branch of
government.
There’s an architectural saying that “form follows function,”
and a lot of cities in Missouri have structured their municipal
courts around the functions that they want them to perform. 
. . . [M]y article in the special issue of the Court Review . . . deals
with institutional independence of the municipal courts.2
Seventy-six percent of the judges are part-time.  Eighty-eight
percent of the prosecutors are part-time.  Thirty-five percent of
the court administrators are part-time, but that’s misleading
because when you ask, “What other functions do you per-
form?” something like 48% of them also have a title or a func-
tion in a department of the executive branch of government,
such as they are court administrator, court clerk, city clerk,
police clerk, clerk for the prosecutor, etc.  We had 31 different
titles the court administrators and court clerks looked at.
When we asked, “Who do you report to?” a minority of them
report to the judiciary.  We had something like 5% that report
to the chief of police, another 5% or 6% that report to the pros-
ecutor.
Now those are structured that way and I think that that’s sort
of a shot across our bow that we need to look at, the institu-
tional independence of the judiciary, and in many of those cases
either the city clerk or the chief of police or somebody in the
executive branch prepares their budget and presents it without
input from the municipal court judge or court administrator, an
area of major concern. . . .
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2. Lawrence G. Myers, Judicial Independence in the Municipal Court:
Preliminary Observations from Missouri, COURT REVIEW, Summer
2004, at 26.
I’m facing a 6 percent ordered cut from the
city of Painesville, who is our local funding
authority, and how do you handle that? What
do you do to save face with the general public?
– Michael A. Cicconetti
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MR. ROBERT WESSELS: . . . It seems to me that whether you’re a
casualty or just get wounded in the budget process, most of the
issues we face need to be addressed long before we ever get in a
room and a confrontation begins, whether you’re state funded or
locally funded.
I happen to come from a state where, other than the appel-
late courts, the state pays the salaries of the general-jurisdiction
judges and a part of the salary of limited-jurisdiction judges.  All
the other expenses for the operation of the court system in the
administration of justice are borne by the counties.
From time to time I’ve been able to reflect a little on things.
When it comes down to it, what do you have to develop in order
to be successful?  I think the foundations are really pretty sim-
ple:  trust and credibility; accountability; becoming fact-based;
managerial competence; and developing a new vocabulary to
explain to funding authorities why we have value in what we do
both in terms of how it will impact them in the administration
of the overall county or state and what the impacts are from the
perspectives of the constituents.
Why is it that the businessman who is the sole proprietor
needs to have access to courts to get a civil matter resolved so
that isn’t hanging over his head and has the business on hold?
What is it that we can do through effective structuring of case
management systems and early screening of cases to stop men-
tally ill offenders from hitting the jails, then going to the hospi-
tal districts, then coming back around . . . and that circle con-
tinues, at huge expense, without someone stepping in?
What can we do to reduce the number of folks who come
back for return business who are poorest?
We know there are effective strategies out there.  We’ve seen
it—whether in the drug courts, mental-health courts, family-
violence courts.  We’ve seen what happens when judges get
involved and the resources are targeted instead of just moving
cases through and getting dispositions.  Unfortunately, we’ve
been largely unable to put a value on that and explain that to the
funders in terms that they can appreciate and recognize how
that impacts the other areas of their budget.
In our county alone, through changing some case-manage-
ment practices, we reduced the average daily jail population by
350 persons by having cases screened immediately, 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, having judges provided information
they needed to make decisions on jail and bond.  Well, 350 peo-
ple on average per day at what is now $65 a day becomes real
money.
If you can reduce the amount of time a case takes to get
through the system, you can just say you cut it in half.  Without
changing a court cost or raising a fine, you will have doubled
the amount of revenue as a result of case disposition.
I think we have to become much more adept and much bet-
ter at describing our business and our process in a way in which
we can show the value that it has to both the citizens and to the
funding authorities.
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . A personal aspect:  I’m facing a 6%
ordered cut from the city of Painesville, who is our local fund-
ing authority, and how do you handle that?  What do you do to
save face with the general public?  Because what happens is you
get a backdoor response.
Recently, and I don’t know if it was because of budgetary rea-
sons or not, in Kansas City, for instance, you would say I need
this money to have the cases flow like they should flow and
have dispositions properly completed.  Well, then they start
checking your key card:  “Well, you came in at 9:15 in the
morning.  You should have been here at 9:00.  If you want to get
your cases through, then do the work on time and don’t leave
before 4:30.”
And then, of course, that is just a fire for the press and it goes
on and, all of a sudden, because you fought over a budget cut,
you are now facing a public outcry as to your work habits and
schedule, and we’re getting hammered on that.
The question here is the judicial independence.  How has
anyone handled that with budget cuts?  Did you make the bud-
get cuts? . . .
JUDGE JEROME LaBARRE:  . . . I’m a general-jurisdiction judge
from Portland, Oregon.  We have 38 judges on our court.
Oregon’s economy took a real dive in the last couple years and
as a result, and maybe my colleague from a neighboring court,
Judge Nachtigal, can give the exact figure, but I think it was
around a 20% budget cut we took in the middle of a biannual
budgeting time period.  We had to go to four-day weeks with
our staff.  We had to give 10% budget cuts of our staff.  Judges
The topic for today is, “Is judicial indepen-
dence a casualty in state and local budget bat-
tles?” In Missouri, in many of the municipal
courts the answer would be no, not because
they’re not a casualty, but because they 
couldn’t get a ticket to the fight. They 
weren’t invited by the judicial branch . . . .
– Lawrence G. Myers
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came in five days a week, but on Fridays there was no staff.
There were no court sessions.  We had numerous cuts.
In Portland, one of the things we did to try to take this crisis
and turn it into an opportunity is we started a very active judi-
cial outreach effort, which actually I have been chair of the com-
mittee.  Among other things, we gave 60 speeches to commu-
nity groups within about a 14-month period.  We’re still doing
this.
We’ve set up a program with our legislators in the Portland
metropolitan area.  The metropolitan area is about a million and
a half people, and the legislators come to our court once a year.
We have kind of an open house we present.  We don’t put our
hands out and say we want money, but we try to talk about the
positive things we’re doing in the drug-treatment courts, what
we’re doing in juvenile court, and so we’ve had kind of a multi-
ple set of responses.  We don’t think we’ve got it all figured out
yet, but I’m very encouraged by some of the earlier presenters
because I really do think we need to take a positive approach,
and there really are many things we can do.
I don’t want to downplay this, but one of the things I think is
an incredible strength we have that we don’t realize, we’ve had
the one-jury, one-trial, one-day approach with our juries for a
while.  With our cuts we had to go back to juries for two days.
We have 150 to 200 jurors come in the courthouse now every
single day, four days a week.  If you do the math on that on the
back of an envelope, you’ve got over a hundred thousand citi-
zens coming in the courthouse.
We have a judge give a welcoming talk.  I’m one of the five
judges—it rotates—and I give welcoming talks for about 15 or
20 minutes and I really try to touch on judicial independence,
on how it’s so essential in our democracy.  It goes to the very
core of what we’re about as a country, and I think communicat-
ing with our citizenry this way, we can really turn this thing
around.
So that’s a very long answer to what we’ve done in Portland
with the big crisis.
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . Well, why is it so important that we
maintain control over the budget process for our judicial inde-
pendence? . . .
MR. BUENGER: I’ll go back to an earlier remark that I made, and
that is that I think what has happened over the last 50 years is
there has been a real growth in the sense of the judicial branch
as an institution of government, perhaps more so than at any
point in our nation’s history.  What has come with that fact is
also the opportunity for institutional attack, and I think that
we’re seeing that, for example, in Missouri with an attempt to
repeal the Missouri nonpartisan court plan.  We’ve also seen it
through the budget process because, whether we like it or not,
the legislature’s ultimate weapon is always the budget.
I have been in numerous meetings with legislators.  Recently
a legislator who appeared before our presiding judges men-
tioned that if the court gets involved in the issue of tort reform,
there will be no end to where the legislature might go on bud-
get issues.
Today the administration of justice is intimately tied with the
resources that are available to it.  In the past, the notion of thera-
peutic courts, drug courts and the like, was a foreign concept,
but the courts today are involved in the lives of individuals, per-
haps more so than at any point in the past, and in order to do
that effectively, to do that well, it has to have the resources to
pull that off.
And to the extent that we can’t control, for example, in
Larry’s case, to the extent that the judiciary has very limited con-
trol over its resources and over its budget, that does dictate our
capacity to provide service to the people.  But there is, I think,
an important twist on this, and it was mentioned by the judge
from Oregon and others.  I think when we stand before our leg-
islature and say, “You need to treat us differently,” that that rings
hollow because then the director of the Department of Social
Services gets up and says, “I don’t have any discretion over my
caseload, either.”
Our capacity to articulate judicial independence in the bud-
get context is fairly limited.  We’re not very good at it.  We sim-
ply are not.  We kind of rely on this concept of judicial inde-
pendence, but we really haven’t explained it well, and I think if
we’re going to secure the resources that we need to actually
administer the justice system well, part of what is incumbent
upon us is to explain to the public what we do and to be willing
to be held accountable for how we use resources.
I always think of judicial independence as two prongs.  One
is the judge’s decisional independence, your capacity as a judge
to say yes and no, and to do so without undue influence from
outside political institutions or outside groups.  I also think that
there is an institutional independence, and while I would never
advocate judges having to stand before a legislative body as John
Marshall once suggested to explain your decisions, the flip side
of it is judicial independence cannot be a shield by which the
institution holds itself unaccountable to the public.
I think that . . . the greatest challenge for us is to begin to
think of ways that we are willing to institutionally hold our-
selves accountable to the public, and to that extent I think we
will be much more successful in securing the funding that we
need.  Organizations that demonstrate a capacity of success,
succeed.  Organizations that sit back and try to defend existing
principles even in the face of evidence that you can’t do it that
way anymore, will fail.  And the challenge for us in this new
change, this kind of paradigm of growth, I think, of the institu-
tional judiciary, is to figure out ways by which we will hold our-
selves accountable to the public, to one another, for the way we
use resources, for the way that we run our courts.
I think in doing that we secure not only the independence of
the institution, but I also think we secure the independence of
what you do, which is the most important thing, which is to
render impartial justice so that when people come into the
courtrooms of the United States and our states, they at least have
a sense that they have a fair shake.
MR. MYERS: I would agree with that and also clarify my earlier
statement.  We receive a great deal of support from Mike and his
office.  I think that there’s things that we need to learn and that
we can learn, and I think the drug courts have provided us with
some opportunities.  There’s community involvement, including
the location that Ron George was talking about, going out into
the community, coalition building with stakeholders, service
providers.  There’s media involvement.  The media is enthralled
with drug courts.
But what I also think they are able to do and where the state
office helps the municipal courts is they help to articulate and
understand what their purpose is, what they are about, what
they are doing, and then they are able to report back to the com-
munity how successful they have been in doing it, and I think
that as I do my research on the municipal courts, I’m appalled
at how they don’t understand—many of us in the system—what
our purpose is.
There are those in the state of Missouri in the municipal
courts who think the purpose of the municipal court is to gen-
erate revenue for the city.  They forget our job is to do justice,
to provide equal protection, to guarantee you liberty, to
enhance social order, and to guarantee due process of law, and
I think that that’s what we need to be able to articulate, like
Mike says, what our purpose is and then also how well we are
doing that. . . .
MR. WESSELS: You know you don’t get funded when the fund-
ing authority doesn’t understand both in terms of need and
value, and I think oftentimes we begin in these situations to be
reactive when every other department is going in and saying
here is the minimum level of X that we have to have.  Pick an
agency.  You’ve been to the hearings.  You know how those
things go.
I think the judiciary and the court systems need to become
much more proactive even before the budget starts, before you
get in the mechanics of preparing the budget, and go in to fund-
ing authorities and be talking about here is what we need.  Here
is what we can accomplish if you will fund program X or Y, if
you allow us to expand this, if you will give us the resources
and invest in us to do a pilot program.
Having done that, though, the judiciary needs to accept
being accountable for the performance of those programs, for
how we’re using those dollars, and once again, instead of wait-
ing for the legislature to say, “Here are your performance mea-
sures,” we should be going in and saying, “Here is how we are
going to measure ourselves,” and turn the argument around
and make the argument in terms of programs that relate to
funding screens and the consequences of not funding, and get
out in front of this issue instead of being reactionary to it. . . .
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . You know you talk to judges at these
conferences and I don’t think I’ve ever spoken to one judge who
isn’t sensitive about the expense of attending a conference:
“Make sure that all your expenses are documented, they’re rea-
sonable, etc., to go back.”
Well, in Ohio, and there’s, I think, four or five municipal
judges here from Ohio, we have a little secret and it’s a little out
that we have.  It’s a permissive statute called a “Special Projects
Fund” that allows municipal judges to attach a dollar amount
to each case that goes through the court, charge the defendant
for that, and use it for special projects.  The money is collected
by the court, it goes into the city treasury, but cannot be spent
without a journal from the judge, so you are accountable for it,
but it also doesn’t come out of your general fund . . . —for edu-
cational expense, travel expenses, extra building projects that
you may want to do.  It can only be spent by the judge and only
by journal.
So some of the expenses I use in particular, any AJA
expenses, come out of the special projects.  It does not come
out of my normal travel budget, which I use for the local north-
ern Ohio and also for the state judicial programs.  So that, I sup-
pose, avoids some possible criticism under the general budget
and it saves that.  That’s not subject to the 6% cuts that we got.
Does anyone else have anything?  How is your spending?
When you come to these conferences, is anybody not con-
cerned about public reaction to that, even though you know
that you should be here and the education, the 13 1/2 hours
that you gain here, is for judicial education?  But who amongst
us is not concerned about any public reaction to that?  I think
we all are, but is that another constraint on our judicial inde-
pendence? . . . .
MR. RON H. GARVIN: I’m going to make a statement and, of
course, I come from a different perspective than most folks in
the room here.  For those who don’t know me, I’m the Vice
Chairman of the Board, Veterans Appeals.  That’s in the federal
system and currently I’m the acting chairman.
Several years ago we had a cut in our budget that was given,
passed on to us by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.  We had a
cut in budget of about 15.4%.  Now just to give you a perspec-
tive of where we are, I have 56 judges and about 228 clerks that
support this system.  We do about 38,000 appeals a year.  That’s
what we did this year.
When we were cut by 15%, I had a Board of Judges meeting
and in that meeting we talked about judicial independence, but
we also talked about judicial collegiality, and what the judges
determined in that Board of Judges meeting is that with a 15.4%
cut in budget, we were going to improve productivity, and we
did.
We improved productivity for the clerks by 20%, measurable
and articulable, and we improved the output of the judges by
25% in that year we were cut.  Since then, because of our cred-
ibility, our budget has been increased every year and we’re
almost back to where we started, and I think within a year or so
we’re going to be beyond that.
So there is judicial independence.  Nobody ever tried to tell
us how to decide cases, what should be contained in those deci-
sions, and as a matter of fact, during that period of time we
improved our, what we call, deficiency-free decisions from like
90% to 93%.
So along with independence, you need leadership and colle-
giality and perhaps that will help, and I think you gentlemen
are saying the same things.  Prove that you’re going to do it.
Thank you.
JUDGE JAY D. DILWORTH: I’d like to comment on your fund
that you used to fund some of this.
Eighteen years ago, when I became a judge in Nevada, there
was a statute that provided $10 for every traffic and misde-
meanor fine to go into a fund that would be for court use.  The
original court would get $2.50.  The $7.50 would go into the
Supreme Court AOC, and specifically in the legislature it says
your funding source cannot offset your budget by that amount.
However, it has now reached up to a maximum of a hundred
dollars on fees—and I don’t have the figures, but a real large
percentage of the Nevada Supreme Court budget—that’s theirs,
not initially with us.  The Supreme Court’s [budget] comes from
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that fund and any time we say we want to do it locally, [they
say,] “You fund it.”
And so one of the things that happened is the legislature saw
this as a way to grab some of the money that goes to the state,
50% plus a dollar goes to the court.  Forty-nine [percent] goes
to the Department of Vehicles, training, whatever the legislature
wants to do.  They found another funding source by just con-
tinually increasing this amount.  You can have a $5 fine in
municipal court and I believe it’s $65, is what it works out to be.
So you got to watch out for that.  It can really come back to
bite you, and whenever we want something, they say, “Well, pay
for it for yourself.”  Yes, we do use it, but it’s that kind of a sit-
uation, so it can be a double-edged sword. . . .
JUDGE JAMES W. OXENDINE:  . . . I’m a superior-court judge
in Georgia and I have sat on the other side of the fence.  I have
been in the legislature.
You know what we do in Georgia, and we’re funded by the
state, we find through the Council of the Superior Court
Judges, and I know most states have an organization similar to
that, we at our midyear meeting develop our legislative pack-
age.  We develop our budget.  We then submit our budget to the
supreme court justice, who speaks for the judges of general
jurisdiction.
Now the state court, the magistrates, and the other judges in
Georgia that are funded by local jurisdictions, they sort of pad-
dle their own way, but at the general level with superior-court
judges, once we get our budget in place and we submit it, we
then break out into our own area and certainly if we had any
influence in our own area of influence, and we will work with
the legislature.
For example, I served with the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee in the House.  Well, I will go to Tom and say,
“Look, Tom, we need some help.”
Now the governor has nothing to do with our budget.  We
bypass him and the governor’s budget altogether and go straight
to the chief justice.  He presents our budget.  The legislature
votes it up or down or they can amend it.  The only way the
governor can get to us is he can veto, and that’s not been done
in the 20 years that I’ve been involved in this situation.
What I would recommend if you are in a situation like we’re
in, you need to do your planning and work the legislature.
Now we have on our finance committee or our appropriations
committee in the House, there’s about 15 people, but about five
or six of them make the decision, and we work those folks.  I
mean we don’t let them go to bed until they know why we have
in our budget what we have.  Frankly, I have had some things
that we’ve asked for we did not get, but the basic support of the
courts we’ve always gotten and we’ve never had a decrease and
we’ve never had the legislature to ask us to give back or to cut
our budget, and I’ve been doing this for 20 years.
So I would just simply suggest that, and somebody said
awhile ago, “Well, we have judicial independence.”  That does
not mean that we don’t have to, ever once in a while, beg.
I learned a long time ago when I first got into politics if you
ain’t born with it, you have to beg people to vote for it, and I’m
not above begging when it comes to money, and judges ought
to realize that sometimes we ought to beg a little.  Thank you.
JUDGE JOHN E. CONERY:  . . . On these court-cost issues, you
got to be real careful that they don’t get out of hand.  In
Louisiana, the basic court costs are up above $200 in our juris-
diction, so if you run a stop sign, the fine is $25, but the court
cost is $225, so it’s $250 and people are starting to get upset.
The legislature passes these court-cost initiatives to keep
from having to raise taxes.  When any special-interest group
wants money, like CASA or the crime lab, it’s supported by
these court costs.  Different entities.  Of course, the judges get
a cut for our travel and whatever else we want to do, like you,
the discretionary fund.  The DA gets a cut for the operation of
his office, and the clerk of the court, the sheriff.
By the time everybody is dipping into the pot, the poor
sucker that runs a stop sign is funding the criminal-justice sys-
tem, and that creates a big backlash, you understand, on the
part of public.  You know they don’t mind paying a $25 fine if
they run a stop sign, but why does this poor sucker have to
fund the entire state operation of the judiciary, the district attor-
ney, the sheriff, the clerk, and everybody else?  So we got to be
real careful about that because it could get out of hand quickly,
as it has in Louisiana.
I think what has happened over the last 50
years is there has been a real growth in the
sense of the judicial branch as an institution
of government . . . . What has come with that
fact is also the opportunity for institutional
attack . . . .
– Michael L. Buenger
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Just as a short aside, there is a committee now established by
the legislature to try to control these court costs to make sure
that a legitimate request is made before it is voted on by the leg-
islature.  It doesn’t work.  Our own DA went and bypassed that
committee, who turned down his request for a $25 additional
fee to fund his truancies, and went directly to his legislators,
put it in a local bill, and it passed.  So be very, very careful about
adding court costs. . . .
JUDGE NORMAN MURDOCK:  . . . I’m retired.  I’m a police-
court judge from Hamilton County, Ohio, and spend my win-
ters in Sedona and decided to come over because I have an
interest in what happens in the courts.
Somewhat echoing what was said before, I spent a long time
in the legislature and was a county commissioner in Hamilton
County, and I’m sure the two Mikes are familiar with the
processes in Ohio.  I think it’s important to remember—for the
judges particularly—that other elected officials, especially those
who do funding, feel a serious obligation for the accounting of
those moneys that they’re responsible for, so the judges must, I
think, understand that and recognize that when they’re dealing
with the other branches of government.
I became a judge later in my political career and sometimes
I felt rather demeaned by judges and their approaches to me
either as a county commissioner, as a funder, or as a legislator
playing a leadership role, and sometimes I think also the judges
feel and exercise their authority in their role in a rather aloof
manner, and I think that is counterproductive, quite frankly.
Echoing what was said earlier, we would see judges in the
legislature essentially in the budgetary process when they
wanted something, when they needed money, when they
wanted to fund their budget, as well on a county level in the
major metropolitan counties see the judges and their people
come before us when they wanted something, and I think
judges forget that this is a political process, unfortunately or
fortunately.
I think we’re all accountable, whether we’re judges or not,
but I think it is essential that judges and their representatives
on a regular and frequent basis become, if you will, friends of
those in the other offices that account for those budgets and
that make those decisions about budgets, and I don’t think
that’s demeaning.  I think, on the other hand, it is important
and I think it goes towards establishing judicial independence,
not aside from the philosophy that we all believe in, in judicial
independence, but establishing that independence in your rela-
tionship with people on the county level and with people on the
legislative level.
Other than the public confrontations, I would suggest and
urge if you have those private, legitimate, and yet worthy meet-
ings and explanations of what you’re doing and why you’re
doing it, everybody knows the role of the judiciary.  There’s no
secret in terms of the role of the judiciary, but establishing those
relationships I think are essential, and I would encourage you
to do that.  Thank you.
Michael A. Cicconetti is judge of the Painesville (Ohio) Municipal
Court.  He was vice president of the American Judges Association
in 2004-2005.  He is known for creative sentencing practices in
misdemeanor cases.  
Michael Buenger has been the state court administrator in
Missouri since 2000.  Before that he was the state court adminis-
trator for South Dakota from 1995 to 2000.  He is a past president
of the Conference of State Court Administrators and has a law
degree from St. Louis University School of Law.
Lawrence G. Myers is the municipal court administrator for the
city of Joplin, Missouri.  He is a past president of the National
Association for Court Management.  He spent 17 years with the
juvenile bureau of the district court in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and served
as administrator of the juvenile division of the circuit court in
Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri.  
Robert Wessels has served since 1976 as the court manager for the
county criminal courts at law in Harris County (Houston), Texas.
He has an M.A. from Houston University and is a fellow of the
Institute for Court Management.  He is a past president of the
National Association for Court Management.
[W]hat do you have to develop in order to be
successful? I think the foundations are really
pretty simple: trust and credibility; account-
ability; becoming fact-based; managerial com-
petence; and developing a new vocabulary to
explain to funding authorities why we have
value in what we do . . . .
– Robert Wessels
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